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MJ merger control—discretion to review transactions below thresholds—checklist

MJ merger control—discretion to review transactions below thresholds—checklist This Checklist sets out those jurisdictions worldwide that have the power to review/require notification of transactions that fall below mandatory notification thresholds (excluding any sector-specific rules, or the application of general antitrust (behavioural) rules). For more details on notification thresholds, see further, MJ merger grid—jurisdiction. Jurisdictions where competition authorities have the discretion to review transactions below thresholds Below is a list of jurisdictions where competition authorities have the power to review/require notification of transactions that fall below mandatory notification thresholds (excluding any sector-specific rules or the application of general antitrust (behavioural) rules). • Angola • Argentina • Australia • Bahrain • Barbados • Belarus • Brazil (note—for up to one year after closing) • Canada • CEMAC • Central African Republic • Chad • Chile (note—for up to one year after closing) • China • COMESA • Costa Rica • Cyprus • Denmark • Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) • Ecuador • Egypt ...

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International merger control developments—January/February 2021

International merger control developments—January/February 2021 This month has seen amendments to the merger control regime in Germany enter into force (including revisions to the thresholds), annual amendments to thresholds in Canada, Mexico and Uzbekistan, the announcement of the annual threshold revision in the US and clarification to the application of the COMESA thresholds. Germany—amendments, including new notification thresholds, in force The amendments to the competition law in Germany, including changes to the merger control regime, have entered into force. The amendments include increases to the notification thresholds. The revised thresholds require transactions to be notified where one of the two threshold groups are met: • Threshold group one: • the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of all the undertakings concerned exceeds €500m (approximately US$608.3m) (no change), and • the domestic turnover of at least one undertaking concerned exceeds €50m (approximately US$60.8m) (increased from €25m), and • the domestic turnover of another undertaking concerned exceeds €17.5m (approximately US$21.3m) (increased from €5m) • Threshold group two: • the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of...

International merger control developments—May/June 2021

International merger control developments—May/June 2021 This month has seen the entry into force of the new mandatory pre-merger notification regime in Peru and a call for lower notification thresholds in Finland. Peru—new mandatory pre-merger notification regime enters into force The new mandatory pre-merger notification regime in Peru has now entered into force. Now, transactions require notification in Peru, with closing to be suspended pending clearance, when the following thresholds are met: • the parties to the transaction must have a combined turnover in Peru of at least PEN 519.2m (approximately €110.8m/US$135.7m), and • two of the parties to the transaction must each have turnover in Peru of at least PEN 79.2m (approximately €16.9m/US$20.7m). Note­ – the thresholds are based on multiples of the Peruvian Tax Reference Units (‘UITs’), which are updated each year; the figures above are based on the current value of the UIT. The current multi-purpose market regulator, INDECOPI, will enforce the new merger control regime. Where the thresholds are met, transactions must be notified and closing suspended...

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Competition law compliance—dominant position guide for staff

Competition law compliance—dominant position guide for staff 1 What is dominance? 1.1 As a rough rule of thumb, once a business consistently has a market share in excess of 40%, it is likely to be in a dominant position. That market share typically needs to have been maintained for at least two years. However, market shares are not the only factor in determining whether a business is dominant—it will be dominant if it can act, to an appreciable extent, independently of its competitors, customers and consumers in the relevant market. 1.2 When an organisation occupies a position of dominance, it has a ‘special responsibility’ not to allow its conduct to impair genuine competition. Failure to adhere to the ‘special responsibility’ puts a business at risk of abusing a dominant position. Determining what might be abusive is not always clear-cut. 2 Why market dominance is a concern 2.1 Dominant businesses have a special responsibility to ensure their conduct does not distort competition. 2.2 Dominant companies should constantly assess their conduct...

Message from CEO on introduction of competition law compliance policy

Message from CEO on introduction of competition law compliance policy Date: [insert date] From: [Insert name and job title] Competing fairly benefits both businesses and consumers. Competition shows companies where they need to improve and encourages organisations to strive for greater efficiency, become more innovative, more productive, and ultimately be better businesses. Competition law is designed to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour, and safeguard effective competition. All businesses must comply with competition law and there can be serious consequences for businesses and individuals, including directors, for non-compliance, including heavy fines, prison sentences, director disqualifications and reputational damage. 1 What is competition law compliance? Competition law is designed to protect businesses and consumers from anti-competitive behaviour, and safeguard effective competition in the markets in which they operate. All businesses must comply with competition law and there can be serious consequences for businesses and individuals for non-compliance, including heavy fines, prison sentences, director disqualifications and reputational damage. 2 How does this affect us? Competition law may become...

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Competition weekly highlights—17 April 2025

This week's edition of Competition weekly highlights includes, from a UK perspective: (1) the Court of Appeal's judgment dismissing an appeal against a CAT ruling approving litigation funding arrangements regarding a damages action brought against Apple alleging abuse of dominance in the supply of Apple iPhones, (2) publication by Ofwat of its revised approach to water and wastewater mergers, (3) the CMA's decision to fine Keysight Technologies for failing to provide documents to the CMA during a phase 1 merger investigation, and (4) the CMA's decision to launch a call for inputs to inform its review of the Subsidy Control Act 2022.

UK Competition law—daily round-up (16/04/2025)

A round-up of UK competition law developments, including (amongst other things) the Court of Appeal’s judgment dismissing appeal relating to CAT’s ruling approving litigation funding arrangements in damages action brought against Apple alleging abuse of dominance in the supply of Apple iPhones.